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Abstract 
The article deals with EU judicial rhetoric and aims to demonstrate how a selection of modal 
adverbs of certainty (indeed, clearly, (not) necessarily and of course) are used in the Opinions 
of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). To this end, it focuses on the 
rhetorical functions of these adverbs, such as adding emphasis, showing a high degree of 
commitment and backgrounding alternative viewpoints. The study applies the notions of 
stance and engagement (Hyland, 2005) and builds on the research into modal adverbs of 
certainty reported in Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007). In summary, the analysis 
sheds light on the rhetorical potential of modal adverbs, stressing the dialogic dimension of 
legal opinion writing. 
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Introduction1 
Despite the wealth of publications which 
approach modality from various angles, 
there are still many unexplored aspects 
which can provide new insights and, 
eventually, lead to a re-contextualization of 
this linguistic phenomenon. The use of 
modal adverbs of certainty in legal opinion 
writing seems to be an under-researched 
area and therefore calls for a more 
thorough treatment. Thus, the goal of this 
paper is, on the one hand, to highlight the 
dialogic orientation of legal opinion writing 
and, on the other hand, to demonstrate the 
rhetorical usefulness of a selection of 
modal adverbs which, it is argued, index 
some degree of dialogicity and are used 
not only to express the writer’s attitude to 
                                               
1  The article uses material from the talk “Modal 
adverbs of certainty in lawyers’ rhetoric at the 
European Court of Justice” delivered on 10 October 
2013 at the conference Rhetorik in Europa: 
Konvergenz und Divergenz organized by the European 
Institute of Rhetoric at Saarland University, 
Saarbrücken, Germany. The material has been 
reworked and extended. 
knowledge, but also to position his or her 
arguments against alternative viewpoints. 
 
1. A dynamic approach to modal adverbs 
Epistemic or modal adverbs can be found 
within the various classifications of adverbs 
proposed in grammar books (see, e.g., 
Biber, et al., 1999). However, these 
accounts seem to overlook the distinction 
between the semantic and pragmatic 
meanings of modal adverbs, which, as 
White (2003) argues, are used for a number 
of reasons beyond those related to the 
assessment of the speaker’s or the hearer’s 
knowledge. The importance of such a 
distinction is underlined by Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, pp. 4–5), 
who adopt an interactive approach to 
modal adverbs of certainty, interpreting 
their use, especially in argumentative 
discourse, in the context of other 
utterances, both real and imagined. As 
Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 
41) state, “[t]he rhetorical function or effect 
of an adverb of certainty is to signal that an 
utterance presents a stronger argument 
Topics in Linguistics (2017), 18(1), pp. 48-58 
 
 
49 
 
than an alternative one.” Therefore they 
hold that speakers use adverbs expressing 
a high degree of certainty in order to 
position themselves towards other 
discourse participants or other voices 
(Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 
33) as well as to influence the hearer’s 
attitudes, beliefs or expectations.    
Drawing on Chafe’s (1986) classification 
of evidentials, Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer (2007, p. 84) group adverbs of 
certainty into four clusters: 1) epistemic 
adverbs; 2) evidential adverbs; 3) 
expectation adverbs, and 4) speech act 
adverbs. Adverbs in the first category (e.g. 
certainly, definitely, indeed, no doubt, 
undoubtedly, surely) express the speaker’s 
high degree of commitment to the truth of 
the proposition, whereas adverbs found in 
the second group (e.g. obviously, clearly, 
plainly, evidently, manifestly) express 
certainty based on evidence. The third 
cluster, in turn, includes adverbs (e.g. of 
course, naturally, inevitably, necessarily) 
whose “core meaning of certainty is based 
on the fact that the state of affairs is in 
accordance with expectations” (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 84). 
Finally, the fourth group of adverbs (e.g. 
admittedly, undeniably, indisputably, 
arguably) includes those which express 
certitude “through conveying explicitly that 
the speaker’s viewpoint is to be seen in the 
light of alternative voices” (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 84). 
Yet, as the authors admit, since adverbs 
tend to be multifunctional, the proposed 
classification serves merely as a starting 
point and it may be the case that an analyst 
will have to assign particular adverbs to 
several classes (Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer, 2007, p. 83).2 
 
2. Aims, method and data 
The study reported here focuses on the 
rhetorical3 usefulness of modal adverbs of 
certainty in legal opinion writing. More 
specifically, attention is drawn to the 
linguistic preferences of the Advocates 
General at the ECJ, and an explanation of 
their possible pragmatic motivation is 
                                               
2  This is in agreement with prototype theory, 
advocated by cognitive linguists (see, e.g., Geeraerts, 
2006). 
3   In this article, the word “rhetorical” is used to 
describe language resources which fulfil interpersonal 
functions (cf. Schwenter and Traugott, 2000) and 
which speakers/writers deploy to orient themselves 
towards other speakers/writers and their respective 
standpoints. 
offered. The study also seeks to reveal the 
multifunctionality of the adverbs selected, 
resulting from their deployment in the 
argumentation stage of the Opinions, on 
the one hand, and on the other their 
position within specific text segments and 
co-occurrence patterns.  
Methodologically, the research is 
situated within discourse-analytic studies 
of judicial rhetoric and it adopts the broad 
notion of dialogism. The latter subsumes, 
for instance, the concepts of polyphony 
(Anscombe and Ducrot, 1983), 
heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981), and stance 
and engagement (Hyland, 2005).4 Of these, 
Hyland’s (2005) model of stance and 
engagement (originally applied in studies 
of academic texts) appears to be most 
relevant to the current analysis. In this 
approach, stance refers to the ways 
“writers present themselves and convey 
their judgements, opinions, and 
commitments” as well as how they “stamp 
their personal authority onto their 
arguments,” whereas engagement denotes 
the features through which writers 
recognize the presence of their readers, 
focus their attention, and guide them to 
particular interpretations (Hyland 2005, p. 
176). The study also draws on the 
discourse-pragmatic model of Concession 
proposed by Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson 
(2000) and developed by Barth-Weingarten 
(2003), in which Concession is defined as a 
sequence of (implied) claims, 
acknowledgments and counterclaims, all of 
which may appear in a variety of 
configurations. 
The dataset used for analysis comprised 
30 Opinions delivered in the period of 
March 2011 to March 2013.5 Although the 
whole corpus consists of approximately 
250,000 words, the analysis was based on 
a subcorpus totaling 145,000 words, 
composed of the persuasive argumentation 
stage of the Opinions. At this point, it 
should be added that the Advocates 
General can write their Opinions in any of 
the official languages of the EU. Therefore, 
since only those Opinions originally written 
in English were used to compile the corpus, 
the number of authors was limited. 
Consequently, texts written by four 
                                               
4  For a discussion of dialogic approaches to discourse, 
see also Emondson (2014) and Fetzer (2014). 
5  The Opinions were downloaded from  
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en  
(date of access: 10 May 2013). 
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Advocates General (British, Finnish, Slovak 
and Portuguese) were used.6 
It should, too, be noted that the 
Advocates General present Opinions on the 
cases to which they are assigned and that 
they deliver their Opinions (which, 
however, are not binding for the ECJ) only if 
the ECJ believes that a given case raises a 
new point of law. As to their 
communicative purpose, Opinions serve 
primarily “to persuade the Court that the 
solution proposed is well founded from a 
legal point of view and [that] the court’s 
rulings should be based on it,” and, 
further, “to persuade the litigants that the 
rulings of the Court which follow are based 
on a thoroughly and justly argued legal 
Opinion, and therefore, are the right 
decisions” (Salmi-Tolonen (2005, p. 66).  
Since the primary function of the 
Opinions is that of persuasive 
argumentation rather than the prescription 
of a certain course of action, the Advocates 
General present their views, accepting or 
rejecting the claims advanced by the 
litigant parties in the previous phases of 
the legal process (Salmi-Tolonen, 2005, p. 
61). Typically, such argumentation involves 
the following stages (adapted from Salmi-
Tolonen, 2005, p. 91): “Recognizing the 
rule,” “Interpreting the contents,” 
“Institutional support,” and “Persuasive 
argumentation” (Table 1). 
Role in 
argumentation 
Propositional 
content 
Author 
visibility 
Recognizing the 
rule 
Object and the 
type of case; 
Definition of 
the legal 
domain 
Implicit 
Interpreting the 
contents 
Reference to 
precedents; 
Metatext 
describing the 
content of the 
Opinion 
(Explicit) 
Institutional 
support 
Legal and 
factual context 
(legislation and 
case law, 
legislative 
antecedents); 
Written 
observations of 
the parties 
Implicit 
                                               
6  Therefore, the data analyzed here represent both 
native and non-native discourse. However, as 
explained later in the article, the distribution of the 
selected adverbs in native vs. non-native discourse in 
the Opinions analyzed does not indicate any 
generalizable trends. As such, it seems to have little 
relevance in the context of the current study. 
Persuasive 
argumentation 
Analysis and 
assessment; 
Opinion and 
proposed 
action 
Explicit 
Table 1: Argumentation process in the Opinions   
To examine the role of modal adverbs of 
certainty in judicial reasoning, the 
“Persuasive argumentation” stage of the 
Opinions was selected for analysis. The 
results are reported in Section 3. 
3. Analysis 
As noted above, the analysis covered the 
last stage of the Opinions, in which case 
author visibility was explicit. At the outset, 
following Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer’s (2007) classification, I identified 
the most common modal adverbs in the 
data. Of a total of 205 adverbs, the 
following were the most commonly 
employed: indeed (59 tokens), clearly (56 
tokens), (not) necessarily (25 tokens) and 
of course (13 tokens), as shown in Table 2.7 
The two most frequent adverbs, that is 
indeed and clearly, represented the 
categories of epistemic and evidential 
adverbs, respectively, while the least 
frequently employed adverbs (e.g. 
undoubtedly, unquestionably) belonged to 
the class of speech act adverbs. 
 
Modal 
adverb 
of  
certainty 
Category Raw 
count 
Normed 
score 
(freq. per 
million 
words) 
indeed Epistemic  
adverb 
59 (406) 
clearly Evidential  
adverb 
56 (386) 
(not) 
necessarily 
Expectation  
adverb 
25 (172) 
of course  Expectation  
adverb 
13 (89) 
apparently Evidential  
adverb 
8 (55) 
manifestly Evidential  
adverb 
8 (55) 
plainly Evidential  
adverb 
6 (41) 
admittedly Speech act  
adverb 
5 (34) 
certainly Epistemic  
adverb 
5 (34) 
                                               
7   To put the figures in perspective, the epistemic 
modal verbs may and might had 220 and 60 
occurrences, respectively. 
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obviously Evidential  
adverb 
5 (34) 
arguably Speech act  
adverb 
4 (27) 
definitely Epistemic  
adverb 
4 (27) 
inevitably Expectation  
adverb 
3 (20) 
undoubtedly Epistemic  
adverb 
2 (13) 
unquestionably Speech act  
adverb 
2 (13) 
Table 2: Modal adverbs of certainty in the data 
 
As for the distribution of the most common 
modal adverbs in native vs. non-native 
discourse (Table 3), it was observed that 
clearly, (not) necessarily and of course 
were more frequent in native discourse 
than in non-native discourse. Indeed, on 
the other hand, seemed to be favoured in 
non-native discourse. However, since the 
range of the data analyzed is limited (as is 
the number of authors), the figures 
obtained do not permit any valid 
generalizations about preferences in the 
use of modal adverbs by Advocates General 
who are native and non-native speakers of 
English. Therefore, these differences are 
not accounted for in the ensuing analysis. 
Rather, it is the relevance of the selected 
adverbs to judicial reasoning that is 
highlighted.  
 
 
Modal 
adverb 
of  
certainty 
Native  
discourse  
(app. 62,500 
words) 
Non-native 
discourse  
(app. 81,800 
words) 
 
Raw 
count 
Normed 
score 
(freq. 
per 
million 
words) 
Raw 
count 
Normed 
score 
(freq. 
per 
million 
words) 
indeed 21 (336) 38 (464) 
clearly 30 (480) 26 (317) 
(not) 
necessarily 
16 (256) 9 (110) 
of course  8 (128) 5 (61) 
Table 3: The most frequent modal adverbs of 
certainty in native vs. non-native discourse 
 
 
 
In the following subsections, the role of 
the most frequently employed modal 
adverbs (i.e. indeed, clearly, (not) 
necessarily and of course) in the 
argumentation stage of all the Opinions in 
the corpus is discussed. Their 
characteristics, as reported in other 
studies, are also briefly provided.  
 
3.1 Indeed 
It might first be observed that indeed, 
representing the category of epistemic 
adverbs, is found chiefly in more formal 
genres (e.g. parliamentary debates, non-
broadcast speeches, and academic writing 
in the humanities) and that it is rather 
infrequent in conversation. 8  Functionally, 
indeed is “linked to epistemic stance and 
can be used to take up positions to what is 
said, to the hearer, to assumptions which 
are attributed to the hearer or to people in 
general” (Aijmer, 2007, p. 330). It is also 
noteworthy that indeed is associated with 
persuasive, argumentative discourse and, 
perhaps more importantly, that it indexes 
the speaker’s authority, conveying as it 
does both confidence and power (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 216).  
Not surprisingly then, with 59 tokens, 
indeed was identified as the most 
frequently employed certainty adverb in the 
corpus, occurring in two clearly identifiable 
patterns. The first of these, the A and 
indeed B schema, incorporating a rhetorical 
addition, marked emphasis. For instance, 
and taking the points which follow as 
examples, in (1) and (2) and indeed is 
deployed to add an element which is more 
important and thus rhetorically stronger 
(cf. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 
2007, p. 107). To be specific, in (1) 
“required” is more forceful than “entitled,” 
while in (2) the Advocate General stresses 
that the finding in question not only “must 
be read”, but that it, in fact, “reveals” its 
true meaning when interpreted in 
conjunction with Art. 13(1). In both 
contexts, when used to add new evidence, 
indeed could be replaced by “furthermore.” 
 
(1) I would point out, however, that the 
main proceedings concern the 
acquisition and installation of solar 
panels in 2005, at which time taxable 
                                               
8   As reported by Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 
(2007, p. 201), the frequency of indeed in 
parliamentary debates is 850 tokens per million words, 
while in the case of direct conversations the figure 
stands at 61. 
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persons were entitled (and indeed 
required) to allocate capital goods as 
between the private and business 
spheres [...] [O-1] 
 
(2) That finding, implying that it is 
permissible to grant such a benefit, 
must be read – and indeed reveals 
its meaning – against the background 
of the principle enshrined in Article 
13(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, 
mentioned above, (23) under which 
[...] [O-26] 
 
The second recurrent pattern involving 
the use of indeed was the Yes, but 
Concessive 9  schema, where indeed was 
used as a marker of (at least partial) 
agreement cueing the acknowledging move 
(X').10 In (3), for instance, where indeed is 
used in combination with the emphatic do, 
the Advocate General confronts the 
absentee opponent and, as phrased by 
Aijmer (2007: 340), “takes up a stance to 
the preceding discourse for rhetorical 
purposes in order to later reject the 
argument.” In other words, by 
foregrounding and backgrounding selected 
arguments in Concessive sequences, 
indeed serves to concede a minor point in 
order to advance a major argument.11 More 
precisely, while in (3) the Advocate General 
admits that the German court’s 
interpretation interferes with the right to 
property guaranteed by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (acknowledgment), 
this interference is, in his view, admissible 
in light of Art. 17(1), if certain conditions 
are met (counterclaim). Thus, while 
admitting partial validity of the claim made 
by the litigant (“while it does indeed 
interfere”), the Advocate General argues 
that, as she believes, the interference is 
justified and thus permissible (“such 
                                               
9   Whenever capitalized, the adjective “Concessive” 
refers to the discourse-pragmatic notion of 
Concession. The use of the lower-case “concessive,” 
on the other hand, refers to the semantic-syntactic 
(interclausal) relation.   
10  In the discourse-pragmatic approach to Concession, 
0 stands for implied claim (which can be inferred from 
context), X stands for claim, X' for acknowledgment, Y 
for counterclaim and Y' for return to counterclaim. 
11  It might be added that the rhetorical potential of  
concessio, i.e. the strategy of “agreeing in order to 
disagree,” was recognized by ancient rhetoricians, 
with Quintilian claiming that “by restricting his claims, 
by giving up certain theses or arguments, a speaker 
can strengthen his position and make it easier to 
defend” (1921‒1933, p. 488 cited in Couper-Kuhlen 
and Thompson, 2000, p. 383). 
interference is in my view clearly 
permitted”). Another thing to note is the 
co-occurrence of concessive and 
contrastive markers: the backgrounded 
argument (acknowledgment) is cued by the 
concessive while, the emphatic do, and 
indeed, whereas the foregrounded 
argument (counterclaim) is marked by the 
contrastive however, and the stance 
markers in my view and clearly. 
   
(3) [X] First, Fujitsu and Hewlett Packard 
argue that the Bundesgerichtshof’s 
interpretation interferes with the 
right to property guaranteed by 
Article 17 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, (61) in that it 
prevents rightholders from granting 
free licences to copy their works. 
[CLAIM] 
[X'] However, while it does indeed 
interfere with that right, 
[ACKNOWLEDGMENT] 
[Y] such interference is in my view 
clearly permitted by the second 
sentence of Article 17(1) of the 
Charter, in so far as it is ‘in the 
public interest and in the cases and 
under the conditions provided for by 
law’ and fair compensation is paid. 
[COUNTERCLAIM] [O-6] 
 
That said, it may be posited that, being 
an “arguing word” (Aijmer, 2007, p. 332), 
indeed is a useful linguistic device which 
helps legal professionals to convey power 
and assert authority as well as to show 
rhetorical engagement in the (mute) 
dialogue with the litigant parties. 
 
3.2 Clearly 
The second most frequently employed 
adverb in the corpus, namely clearly, was 
attested by 56 tokens. As Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, pp. 201–
203) report, this evidential adverb is most 
common in legal cross-examinations and 
business transactions. 12  They also note 
(Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 
199) that clearly is linked to intellectual 
reasoning, rather than interpersonal 
negotiation. As such, it differs, for 
instance, from obviously, which, though 
                                               
12  In Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s data (2007, p. 
201), the frequency of clearly in legal cross-
examinations is 300 tokens per million words and in 
business transactions – 250 tokens per million words. 
By contrast, in direct conversations the figure stands 
at 6 occurrences per million words.  
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seemingly synonymous, has come to 
perform interactional functions in 
conveying solidarity (Simon-Vandenbergen 
and Aijmer, 2007, p. 199).  
During the analysis it was found that in 
the Opinions, clearly was favored over 
obviously, with a frequency ratio of 56 to 5 
tokens, respectively. Again, it can be 
argued that the Advocates General seem to 
prefer those linguistic devices which stress 
power and authority, rather than those 
linked to negotiation and solidarity. It is 
also fair to say that by analogy to indeed, 
clearly, which suggests tangible evidence, 
belongs to rational discussion and 
argumentation (Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer, 2007, p. 226). Consider for 
instance (4), where clearly operates as a 
sentence adverb in its initial position and 
where it can be paraphrased as “it is clear 
that.” In this case, the Advocate General’s 
statement is backed up by external 
evidence, as she claims that a situation in 
which “assistance has ceased within the 
meaning of the second sentence of Article 
12(1)(a)” is the disputed “additional 
trigger.”  
 
(4) Consequently, since the exclusion 
must be presumed to have some 
actual effect, it cannot cease merely 
on departure from UNRWA’s area of 
operation, regardless of the reason 
for the departure. There must be 
some additional trigger. Clearly, 
there is such a trigger when 
assistance has ceased within the 
meaning of the second sentence of 
Article 12(1)(a). [O-12] 
 
In a similar vein, (5) demonstrates how 
clearly is used in logical reasoning to refer 
to solid evidence13 – i.e. the rules stipulated 
by the Sixth Directive – which serves to 
underline the Advocate General’s judicial 
authority and to validate the proposed 
solution to the legal question being 
considered. 
 
(5) At first sight, it would appear that so 
far the Court of Justice has been 
asked only once about the rule 
governing the treatment, pursuant to 
Article 5(7)(a) of the Sixth Directive, 
of certain transactions as supplies 
                                               
13  However, it might also be argued that in this 
instance clearly is an adverb of manner rather than a 
modal adverb reflecting the Advocate General’s 
assessment of the available evidence. 
for consideration: in Gemeente 
Leusden and Holin Groep. (14) In 
that judgment, however, the Court 
clearly focused on other rules laid 
down in the Sixth Directive. [O-14] 
 
Finally, as with indeed, clearly appears 
to be favored by drafters of legal opinion, 
since it stresses accessible evidence and 
conviction based on logical reasoning. 
 
3.3 (Not) necessarily 
Decidedly less frequently employed than 
the two adverbs discussed above, (not) 
necessarily was attested by 25 tokens 
(including 17 tokens of necessarily and 8 
of not necessarily).14 As for necessarily, it 
might first be observed that as an 
expectation adverb, it expresses the 
speaker’s or writer’s conviction regarding 
the inevitability of a certain state of affairs, 
it being a consequence of another state of 
affairs. However, as Simon-Vandenbergen 
and Aijmer observe, even though 
necessarily conveys deontic rather than 
epistemic necessity (2007, p. 188), its 
deontic and epistemic senses often co-
occur (2007, p. 287). It should also be 
added that (not) necessarily (in contrast to 
the other adverbs examined in the current 
study) is never found in sentence-initial 
position, which suggests that even though 
(not) necessarily does express the 
speaker’s stance, it has not progressed as 
far as the other adverbs “on the path 
towards epistemic markers” (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 299). 
Instead, as Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer (2007, p. 299) hold, (not) 
necessarily – in a similar way to definitely – 
is becoming more of a response marker 
with its own specific meaning.  
Some of the above characteristics of 
(not) necessarily have been confirmed by 
the data analyzed in this study. For 
instance, the meaning of expectation 
resulting from external circumstances can 
be seen in (6). Here, the rhetorical effect of 
necessarily is enhanced by the presence of 
the adverb objectively, with the parallel 
structure necessarily and objectively being 
more emphatic than necessarily alone. 
Again, the Advocate General bases his 
argument on clearly verifiable evidence, 
namely “the difference in retirement age,” 
                                               
14  In Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s  (2007) study, 
the distribution of (not) necessarily across different 
genres is not discussed. 
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which must be accepted as the reason for 
the permitted derogation. A similar 
observation can be made with regard to 
(7), where the assessment being referred to 
follows from objective factors, such as the 
relevant legislation, or, more precisely, 
“Title II of Regulation No. 1408/71”. 
 
(6) The Court has held that ‘where … a 
Member State prescribes different 
retirement ages for men and women 
for the purposes of granting old-age 
and retirement pensions, the scope of 
the permitted derogation is limited to 
forms of discrimination which are 
necessarily and objectively linked to 
the difference in retirement age’. [O-
8] 
 
(7) Such an assessment is necessarily 
based on the rules contained in Title 
II of Regulation No 1408/71 which 
concern the determination of the 
legislation applicable. [O-21] 
 
The argumentative use of not 
necessarily, on the other hand, is 
illustrated by (8), where this negative 
adverb is used to deny something that 
appears to be a logical consequence. More 
specifically, according to the relevant 
regulations, fair compensation is due after 
a certain date, but it does not have to apply 
to events occurring prior to that date. The 
lack of “inevitable necessity” is additionally 
emphasized by the epistemic in principle, 
implying the Advocate General’s agreement 
to the general idea but not the specific 
details concerning the case. In this 
instance, as noted earlier, the meanings of 
deontic and epistemic necessity conveyed 
by not necessarily seem to overlap.  
 
(8) That means inter alia that, where a 
Member State has provided for an 
exception or limitation to the 
reproduction right in accordance with 
Article 5(2)(a) and/or (b) of the 
Directive, it is required to ensure that 
rightholders receive fair 
compensation in respect of relevant 
events after 22 December 2002 but, 
in principle, not necessarily before. 
[O-6] 
 
As the above examples demonstrate, 
necessarily and (not) necessarily have their 
rhetorical strengths and are used to stress 
inevitable necessity or its absence, 
resulting from circumstances which are 
beyond the arguer’s control and which, 
therefore, can be regarded as objective.  
 
3.4 Of course 
The last adverb to be discussed in this 
study is of course, an expectation adverb 
which is found mostly in demonstrations 
and broadcast interviews. 15  In the data 
analyzed in the current study its frequency 
was relatively low (13 occurrences); 
however, I believe it still warrants attention.  
Typically, of course is used to redress 
the power balance between interlocutors by 
playing down the speaker’s superiority, a 
superiority which has resulted from the 
possession of knowledge (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 205), 
and it fulfils face-saving functions as a 
politeness marker. Simon-Vandenbergen 
and Aijmer (2007, p. 30) also stress the 
concessive meaning of of course, likening 
it to although, and, at the same time, 
suggesting that it be interpreted as an 
equivalent of the presupposition “as 
everyone knows”. Furthermore, like indeed, 
of course is found to cue acknowledgments 
in Concessive schemata; however, in 
contrast to the authoritative indeed, it 
tends to mark solidarity and equality. In 
certain contexts, it may, conversely, signal 
superiority of the arguer’s knowledge, too.  
Rather unsurprisingly, of all the uses of 
of course identified in the data, the 
concessive meaning stood out most clearly. 
The excerpt shown in (9) illustrates a 
Concessive sequence, where of course is 
used to background an alternative 
standpoint; namely, the assertion that the 
Italian Tribunal is able to reformulate the 
preliminary question submitted for 
consideration by the ECJ, so that it would 
no longer be purely hypothetical. Thus, it is 
especially useful for anticipatory rebuttal,16 
with the arguer weaving into the 
argumentation a possible objection and 
refuting it in the return to the 
counterclaim, signaled with the contrastive 
marker however (counterclaim – 
acknowledgment – return to the 
counterclaim schema). Therefore, whenever 
                                               
15  Contrary to the findings reported here, in Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s (2007, pp. 201–203) data, 
of course ranks as the most frequently employed 
adverb of certainty. Its frequency is highest in 
demonstrations (1,400 tokens per million words), 
broadcast interviews (1,200 tokens per million words), 
and non-broadcast speeches, including lectures 
(1,150 tokens per million words). 
16  Cf. the rhetorical figure of prolepsis. 
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of course is found in the Yes, but pattern, it 
loses its strength as a certainty marker and 
it may be justifiably termed a “precursor of 
disagreement” instead (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer, 2007, p. 303).17  
 
(9) [Y] Nevertheless, in the present case I 
am inclined to conclude that the 
mismatch between the wording of the 
preliminary question on the one 
hand, and the texts of the national 
provision and the observations of the 
parties, on the other, render the 
preliminary reference of a 
hypothetical character both in fact 
and in law. [COUNTERCLAIM] 
[X'] It is, of course, open to the 
Court to simply leave it to the 
Commissione Tributaria Regionale di 
Milano to check the soundness of its 
initial interpretation of national 
law, after the Court has provided 
answers to the questions referred. 
[ACKNOWLEDGMENT] 
[Y'] However, this may be insufficient 
to cure the hypothetical nature of 
the question. [RETURN TO 
COUNTERCLAIM] [O-16] 
 
The concessive meaning aside, another 
context in which of course resurfaced in 
the corpus as a useful rhetorical device 
involved the presupposition of knowledge 
that is in some way taken for granted. 
Accordingly, the as-everybody-knows 
meaning of of course, used to state 
something which is assumed to be known 
both to the writer (here: the Advocate 
General) and the reader (here: the ECJ), can 
be seen in (10). In this paragraph, by 
inserting of course, the Advocate General 
expresses his conviction that the reasons 
for applying an imputation system to 
foreign-sourced dividends are obvious both 
to him and the ECJ (as they were already 
explained by another Advocate General) 
and that therefore they constitute a shared 
epistemic background. 
 
(10) At this juncture it is necessary to 
make two observations. Firstly, the 
aim of applying an imputation 
system to foreign-sourced dividends 
is, of course, to achieve the effect 
                                               
17  Were of course to appear in the counterclaim, 
however, it would boost the writer’s preferred 
argument (as in the Yes, but of course schema), rather 
than serve to concede the opponent’s claim (as in the 
Yes, of course, but pattern exemplified by [9]). 
described by Advocate General 
Geelhoed, in other words, to eliminate 
the effect in the residence State 
taxation of a lower effective tax rate 
in the source State. [O-24] 
 
Overall, the concessive function and the 
solidarity-orientation of of course merit 
attention and the argumentative potential 
of this adverb should not be overlooked in 
rhetorically-oriented analyses of judicial 
reasoning, either. 
 
4. Discussion 
As demonstrated in Section 3, two modal 
adverbs appear to be most salient in 
judicial argumentation, namely: indeed and 
clearly. To be precise, the normed 
frequency of indeed stood at 406 tokens 
per million words, while that of clearly was 
386 tokens. This seems to agree with what 
Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, 
pp. 201–203) report about the distribution 
of indeed across text types, linking it to 
formal argumentative spoken genres such 
as parliamentary debates (with 850 tokens 
per million words) as well as formal 
argumentative writing, such as academic 
writing in the humanities and the social 
sciences (with 600 and 500 tokens per 
million words, respectively). All of the 
above seems to indicate, rather 
unsurprisingly, that indeed is preferred in 
argumentative discourse. 
As for the second most common adverb 
in the data, i.e. clearly, its frequency in the 
corpus (386 tokens per million words) was 
similar to that noted by Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, pp. 201–
203) in the case of legal cross-
examinations (300 tokens per million 
words). In other text categories, for 
instance in different types of academic 
writing, the frequency of clearly was much 
lower and it stood in the region of 100-150 
tokens per million words (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007, pp. 201–
203). This seems to suggest, on the one 
hand, a connection between clearly and 
high-stake encounters, where tangible 
evidence and logical reasoning take centre 
stage and, on the other hand, its limited 
relevance in less challenging 
communicative settings. 
Turning now to (not) necessarily, no 
comparisons can be made with Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s (2007) data, 
since their study does not discuss the 
distribution of this item across different 
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text types. With respect to of course, the 
last of the adverbs analyzed in the current 
study, several observations can however be 
made. While its frequency in the Opinions 
was relatively low (89 tokens per million 
words), in Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer’s (2007, pp. 201–203) research of 
course proved to be the most commonly 
preferred adverb, whose frequency in 
spoken genres greatly exceeded that of all 
the other adverbs. Specifically, the 
frequency of of course in monologic 
demonstrations stood at 1,400 tokens per 
million words, in broadcast interviews at 
1,200 tokens, in non-broadcast speeches at 
1,150 tokens and in parliamentary debates 
at 1,100 tokens. In written genres, 
conversely, the frequency of of course was 
roughly half its frequency in spoken 
genres. It may then be cautiously posited 
that the preference of of course observed 
in spoken communication results from its 
status as politeness marker and the face-
saving role it often performs (although, 
admittedly, it may operate as a marker of 
superiority, too). In the Opinions analyzed 
in this study, the need to stress solidarity 
or equality did not seem to be highly 
relevant and that is perhaps the reason why 
authority-oriented markers such as indeed 
or clearly were preferred over the 
solidarity-oriented of course. 
Notwithstanding the above observation, 
however, larger corpora would need to be 
investigated for these trends to be 
confirmed (or disproved) in different types 
of judicial opinions or judgments. 
Another point worth raising is the 
distinction made in the current study 
between native and non-native discourse. 
Here again a caveat is in order: since the 
corpus is rather small and given the 
uneven distribution of Opinions between 
the individual Advocates General, the data 
do not necessarily reflect patterns in the 
use of modal adverbs which might be 
identified if more representative, balanced 
corpora of judicial opinions were 
examined. This research path seems, 
however, worth pursuing in subsequent 
studies on the construction of judicial 
argumentation by justices who are native 
and non-native speakers of English.  
 That said, what is more relevant to the 
discussion of the role of modal adverbs in 
the Opinions is their distribution within 
argumentative schemata. Although not 
quantitatively oriented, the study seems to 
suggest certain regularities or trends in the 
deployment of individual adverbs. For 
instance, indeed was found in the A and 
indeed B pattern, marking rhetorical 
addition. It was also identified in 
Concessive schemata, where it cued 
acknowledgments (i.e. moves signaling 
partial alignment with an opposing 
viewpoint) subsequently followed by the 
author’s preferred arguments (i.e. 
counterclaims). In this context, indeed co-
occurred with the emphatic do, which again 
increased the rhetorical force of the 
arguments advanced by the arguer. 
The soundness of argumentation was 
also underlined by clearly and necessarily. 
In the case of these adverbs, nevertheless, 
no recurrent argumentative patterns 
emerged. What could be observed, 
however, was that while clearly was 
positionally mobile, occupying both 
sentence-initial and sentence-medial 
positions, necessarily never occurred 
sentence-initially, which indicates that its 
status as an epistemic marker is not at the 
same level as that of the remaining 
adverbs. 
Last but not least, there were several 
occurrences of of course in 
acknowledgments, in which opposing views 
were backgrounded, only to be followed by 
the Advocate General’s preferred 
(foregrounded) argument in the 
countermove. This strategy, it may be 
suggested, created the so-called “put-down 
effect” (Simon-Vandenbergen, White and 
Aijmer 2007), whereby the arguer on the 
one hand admits solidarity with the 
addressee (which could be paraphrased as 
yes, you are right), but on the other hand, 
he or she demonstrates superior (in his or 
her view) knowledge and puts forward the 
preferred claim. In the Opinions, 
counterclaims, given the formal register of 
judicial opinions, were signaled with the 
formal contrastive marker “however,” rather 
than the less formal “but” (which 
nevertheless was used elsewhere in the 
Opinions).18 It is also necessary to add that 
                                               
18  Cf. Szczyrbak’s (2016) data on the co-occurrence 
patterns with but and of course in spoken legal 
communication. As Szczyrbak’s (2016) study reveals, 
in the adversarial trial selected for analysis, of course 
was the most frequent modal adverb to co-occur with 
but in Concessive sequences (with certainly being the 
second most frequent choice). Interestingly, in the 
claimant’s and the witnesses’ turns, of course was 
most frequent as a right collocate of but (i.e. it was 
found in post-but sequences ending with a weaker 
argumentative position or “backing down”), while in 
the turns of the judge and the counsel, of course was 
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while in spoken communication, claims, 
acknowledgments, and counterclaims tend 
to be adjacent moves (or turns at talk), in 
the Opinions this was not always the case. 
As a result, individual moves stretched 
across larger segments of text and as such, 
they had to be interpreted in the larger 
argumentative frame. 
Finally, it can be reiterated that – as the 
foregoing analysis has shown – modal 
adverbs of certainty are used as 
engagement devices which interact with 
“contradictory opinions, points of view, and 
value judgments” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 281). 
Seen in this way, they are found to 
“dialogue” with alternative standpoints or 
possible criticisms, thus constituting 
“interactional structures buried in single-
source narratives” (Edmondson, 2014, p. 
79).    
 
Conclusion 
This article argues that the Advocates 
General at the ECJ use modal adverbs of 
certainty not only to express their attitudes 
towards (certainty of) knowledge but also 
to achieve particular rhetorical goals. The 
study suggests that some of these adverbs 
are common persuasive and argumentative 
devices used by justices to align with, or 
disalign from alternative viewpoints, 
whether actually articulated or only 
anticipated. In particular, the examination 
shows that in their judicial reasoning, the 
Advocates General tend to favor authority-
oriented epistemic adverbs (indeed) as well 
as evidential adverbs referring to evidence 
(clearly) rather than, for instance, speech 
act adverbs, which were least frequently 
employed in the dataset analyzed. Another 
interesting phenomenon in judicial 
argumentation, it was found, is the 
rhetorical strategy of conceding 
(concessio), that is, “agreeing to disagree”, 
involving the use of indeed and of course  
(the two adverbs being used chiefly to 
background alternative viewpoints) in 
argumentative schemata, and thus giving 
                                                                     
more frequent as a left collocate of but (i.e. it was 
found in pre-but sequences signaling the upcoming 
disagreement or counterclaim). This seems to 
corroborate the findings reported here, showing the 
advocates’ preference for the Yes, of course, however 
pattern, in which of course operates as a “precursor of 
disagreement” signaling the upcoming countermove. 
Evidently, the deployment of modal adverbs within 
argumentative schemata depends not only on the 
genre but also on the speaker’s or writer’s status in 
the interaction. 
more prominence to the arguments 
preferred by the Advocates General. 
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